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WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
REVISED EDITION*

LON L. FULLER**

One who undertakes to review the new edition of this great treatise
is faced with no ordinary assignment. His problem is too broad and
too special to permit a comfortable accommodation to the usual patterns
of reviewing practice. Certainly he will feel little temptation to attempt
to compress within the limits of a short review a critical appraisal of
the numerous views and theories expounded in the nearly eight thousand pages of this work. Nor does the present revised edition present
any marked departure from the method and content of its predecessor
which could be reported and appraised in summary fashion. To be sure,
the second edition represents a great improvement over the first. The
work has been much expanded. Certain sections have been substantially revised. References to relevant sections of the various Restatements have been added. The treatment of law review material has been
brought up to date. The volume of forms has been improved and expanded. The index has been reworked and lengthened. The whole
work has been enriched by the contributions of able assistants, notably
Professor George J. Thompson, whose name appears as co-author. Beyond that, -however, there is little to report having specific reference to
the revised edition. The general scope of the work, and its basic approach, remain what they were in 1920, when the first edition was
published.
Perhaps the most useful service I could perform for the readers of
this REVIEW would be to pass on to them certain suggestions concerning

the use of this treatise, based on eight years' experience with the first
edition. The remarks which follow are grouped under three headings,
and deal with the problems: (1) What can the user of the book reasonably expect to find in it? (2) How shall he go about finding what he
needs? (3) How shall he appraise what he has found? Under the
* A Treatise on the Law of Contracts. By Samuel Williston. Revised Edition.
By Samuel Williston and George J. Thompson. New York: Baker, Voorhis &
Co., 1936-38. Vol. I, pp. xix,_926; Vol. II, pp. xi, 927-1723; Vol. III, pp. xii,
1725-2579; Vol. IV, pp. xiii, 2581-3669; Vol. V, pp. xiv, 3671-4699; Vol. VI, pp.
xiv, 4701-5726; Vol. VII, pp. iv, 5727-6703; Vol. VIII, pp. 6705-7725. $80.00.
This article represents the somewhat tardy fulfillment of an obligation incurred
toward the editor of this REVIEW more than two years ago, when only about half
of the volumes of the work under review had appeared. It was substantially
ready for the printer last May, but prior commitments of the REviEw made necessary the postponement of its publication until now.
** Professor of Law, Duke University; Visiting Professor, Harvard Law
School.
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third heading I shall attempt to 'discuss briefly the premises which seem
to me to underlie Professor Williston's legal method and their relation
to contemporary currents of legal thought in this country.
THE SCOPE OF THE WORK

The work deals with the law of contracts. But the law of contracts,
defined and limited how? Certainly not as contracts is defined in a
law school catalogue, or in Professor Williston's own casebook. If one
were limited by the usual curricular conceptions the book would have
to be entitled, A Treatise on Contracts, Specific Performance in Equity,
Sales, Suretyship (nearly 200 pages), Infant's and Married Women's
Contracts, The Parol Evidence Rule, Bills and Notes (240 pages),
Reformation and Rescission, and Damages for Breach of Contract, with
Numerous Incidental References to the Law of Agency, Quasi-Contract,
Tort, Bankruptcy, and the Civil Law of Europe and Rome.
Though the Table of Contents just summarized reveals a work which
cuts freely across curricular boundaries, in another and more subtle
sense the book respects these boundaries scrupulously. In my opinion,
it respects them too scrupulously, and, in consequence, narrows unduly
the scope of contract law. Neat divisions between the various compartments of the law, between contracts and torts, for example, can be preserved only if one does not press too far an inquiry into the underlying
bases of legal liability. When one asks why a contract or tort liability
is imposed, one discovers that the underlying "why", or rather, the
underlying "whys", cut across compartmental divisions of the law. From
such a viewpoint, "contract" is merely a convenient description for a
set of related problems, possessing no definite boundary, but shading off
imperceptibly into the law of tort, property, quasi-contract, and procedure on all sides. Professor Williston has no such conception of contracts. For him a contract liability is something different in kind from
all other kinds of liability, as different from a tort liability, let us say,
as a covenant was different from assumpsit for seventeenth-century
lawyers.
It is this narrow conception of contract, it seems to me, which excludes from the book an adequate discussion of what may be called the
periphery of contract law. An inquiry into the bases of contract liability
suggests that contract is, in one aspect, a branch of a larger department
of the law having to do with the protection of expectancies created by
words or meaningful conduct and embracing contract, estoppel in pais,
and deceit as well as certain other aspects of the law of tort, property,
and quasi-contract. The tentatives of a synthesis along these lines are
to be found in Harriman's excellent, if fragmentary, sections on "The
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Modem Theory of Simple Contract". 1 Wigmore has recently made
valuable suggestions in the same direction in an article which apparently
is not cited in Williston's work at all. 2 The synthesizing efforts of these
men, and others like them, apparently have not appealed to Professor
Williston, and the consequence is that his book contains no adequate
3
discussion of even such a first cousin of contract law as estoppel in pais.
If Williston's treatise is narrower in scope than the subject of contracts as a legal philosopher might define it, it is also, in a special and
very important sense,' narrower than the subject of contracts as the
practitioner would like to see it defined. Everyone who has attempted
to report case law knows how difficult it is to kn6w what to do with the
"wrong" case. One feels an obligation to report what is representative
of the judicial process, and only an anecdotal interest can justify spending much time on mere freaks. But it is not easy to draw the line between that which is representative and that which is too aberrational
to be worthy of comment. In drawing the line, subtle influences of
temperament may be decisive. In the end, the question is almost one
of intellectual taste, and scarcely subject to discussion. I can only record
my personal reaction, which is that Professor Williston has too strict
a sense of what is normal. He seems to me to have rejected as freaks
far too many cases which are really significant.
Three years ago, with the assistance of Mr. William Perdue, I attempted a survey of the American and English cases to determine to
what extent they had recognized, as an appropriate measure of recovery
in suits on contract, the reimbursement of the plaintiff's detrimental
reliance on the defendant's promise. 4 All such cases are, from the standpoint of Professor Williston's system, "freaks", since in his view, the
reimbursement of reliance cannot be a legitimate interest of contract
law.5 While for that reason I had anticipated little assistance from
1
HARRIMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1901) §§646-652.

Wigmore, The Scientific R61e of Consideration in Contract in LEGAL ESSAYS
ORIN Kn McMuRRAy (1935) 641.
' I do not overlook the sections devoted to estoppel in the chapter on Fraud
and Misrepresentation (see espc. §1508). These sections represent the substantially unrevised reprint of an article first published nearly thirty years ago. Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HAv. L. RZv. 415. While
this article undertakes to trace the relations between estoppel and deceit, it relates
neither notion to contract.
In personal conversation I once asked Professor Williston why the Restatement of Contracts did not include the subject of estoppel in pais. He replied by
pointing out that a tort liability may result from an estoppel, as, for example,
where a warehouseman was held for conversion on the basis of a misrepresentation
that certain goods were in his possession. This raises the question, what will the
American Law Institute do with the notion of estoppel in pais? Are we to have
a special Restatement of Estoppel, or, a Miscellaneous Restatement?
'Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (1936-1937)
46 YALE L. J. 52, 373.
54 AmERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS (app. 1926) 98-99; 103-104. The
2

IN TRIBUTE TO

article cited in note 4, supra,"is discussed by Professor Williston in §1338, n. 7, of
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Williston, it was with some surprise that I discovered how extensive a
field of case law had been left unreported in his treatise. 6 The shorter
the new edition of his treatise. At the risk of seeming to digress from the main
purpose of this review, I should like to attempt to answer briefly the arguments
which he advances against the position taken by Mr. Perdue and myself; as a
matter of fact, the manner in which Professor Williston draws the issue between
us is, I think, significant in connection with the problems of method which I shall
discuss later and so not foreign to the purposes of this review.
In the note cited he admits that "reasonable reliance" is "doubtless" one
"juristic" reason for "the recognition of contractual obligations", but goes on to
say that the result of the imposition of a contractual obligation "is a right-duty
relation, and the reasons why the relation is created are interesting but practically
unimportant". He continues, "It requires little argument to show that the proper
norm of damages for breach of a duty to render a certain performance is the
value which that performance would have had if rendered at the time it should
have been."
The argument assumes the existence of a duty ("the duty to perform") and
conceives that this duty determines the measure of recovery. But what is the
actual referent of the word "duty" here? The term "duty" and its correlative
"right" are used in at least two senses: (1) in the natural law sense, to describe
an underlying moral claim and correlative moral obligation which are conceived
to "give rise to" the legal remedy; (2) in the positivistic sense made famous by
Holmes, to describe a supposed reflex effect of the availability of the remedy. In
the first sense, the plaintiff is given a remedy because he has a right; in the second, he has a right because he is given a remedy. Now, it is obvious that Professor Williston cannot be using the term "duty" in this second sense. According
to that view of the thing, it is the measure of recovery which defines the duty,
and since there are numerous cases limiting recovery on contracts to the reliance
interest, these cases will have to be described as cases where the duty involved is
a duty to reimburse reliance only. On the other hand, if Professor Williston
means to use the term "duty" in the first sense, then he is in effect asserting that
if an underlying, casual "duty" is recognized at all, it must be enforced without
qualification, and that the scope of the remedy is automatically determined by the
nature of the underlying "duty" to which it gives sanction. This assumption is
scarcely tenable, even if one is willing to conceive of remedies as "arising out of"
underlying "rights" and "duties". It may be considered that I have a duty to tell
the truth, yet if I violate that duty by telling a lie, and judicial intervention is
thought appropriate, the question remains what the court ought to do to me.
Assuming my fraud consisted in selling a gilded brick for a bar of gold, the court
may make me give the disappointed purchaser the value of a real bar of gold,
or it may feel that it has gone far enough if it compels me to reimburse my
victim's out-of-pocket loss. As is well known, there are precedents justifying both
procedures in actions for deceit. If the problem exists in the law of deceit, I
cannot see why it does not equally exist in the law of contract. Certainly the
issue cannot be foreclosed by assuming a moral duty which sets its own legal
sanction, or by assuming a legal duty so tenacious of life that it continues to
exist even after courts have ceased to enforce it.
'A good deal of the article was devoted to what might be called "contracts of
imperfect obligation" where for various reasons courts have refused to protect the
"expectation interest" and have limited their intervention to reimbursing reliance.
It would take- us too far afield to attempt to discuss in detail the various ways in
which Williston's treatise deals, and fails to deal, with these cases. However,
even in ordinary contracts suffering from no defect of form or substance, courts
have frequently granted reimbursement for the promisee's reliance where it is difficult to measure satisfactorily the value of the performance promised by the defendant. These cases receive a limited recognition in §333 of the Contracts
Restatement and §1363A of the treatise under review. Section 333 of the Restatement provides that the plaintiff may recover for such expenditures as are "reasonably made in performance of the contract or in necessary preparation therefor".
Mr. Perdue and I found, however, about thirty-five cases (dating from 1664 to
1933) in which the plaintiff was granted reimbursement for acts of reliance which
did not take the form of "performance of the contract" or "necessary preparation
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texts on contracts and damages are, to be sure, guilty of a similar omission, though the omission in their case may in part be due to a conscious
or unconscious acceptance of Professor Williston's ground-laying analysis of the whole subject.
That the failure to take account of these "reliance interest" cases is
not an isolated phenomenon is indicated by the fact that Professor Cook
calls attention to another extensive body of "freak" cases which have
been left largely unreported in Williston's revised edition.7 Professor
Cook's discussion of the manner in which such omissions come about is
8
worthy of note.
This failure to take account of decisions which do not fit into its systematics constitutes, in my opinion, the most serious defect in Professor
Williston's treatise from the standpoint of the practicing attorney. What
the author views as an unimportant expression of judicial whimsy may
be to the lawyer an isolated judicial insight, on the basis of which he
may persuade a court to launch on a new development or give a new
construction to an old institution. The stone the builder rejected may
become the head of the corner of the brief-if only the brief writer can
manage to lay his hands on it.
THE UsE OF THE INDEXES

The usefulness of an index is not guaranteed by its length and strict
observance of the order of the alphabet. Its effectiveness presupposes
a system of concepts shared by compiler and user. If the compiler's
and the user's systematics do not quadrate, we have such unfortunate
results as that reported by Holmes when he tells of the Vermont justice
of the peace who gave judgment for the defendant in a suit for the
breaking of a churn because he could find nothing in the statutes under
"churn". This miscarriage of legal method is, of course, repeated on a
somewhat different level in the early stages of almost every piece of
legal research, and will continue to occur until some Gleichschaltung of
our legal minds has impressed them all with the same conceptual matrix.
Meanwhile, it is necessary for either the user or the compiler of the
index to a legal work to follow to some extent the method of the farmer
therefor", as, for example, where a plaintiff is granted reimbursement for expenditures made in anticipation of the arrival of goods delivered to the defendant
carrier for shipment. Fuller and Perdue, supra, note 4, at 91-93, notes 63-66.
Though there is substantially no authority contrary to these cases, they are almost
wholly ignored in Williston's treatise. Some of them are cited, but on other
points than the measure of recovery applied. A few of the seed-warranty cases
are cited as holding that the farmer who is supplied bad seed may recover for his
costs of cultivation, but are treated in such a way (in §1393) as to imply that
they represent a peculiar quirk of the law of warranties, and are not discussed in

connection -with §333 of the Restatement at all.
7 Cook, Williston on Contracts: Revised Edition (1939)
33 Iu.. L. REv. 497,
514.

8 Ibid.
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who attributed his success in finding strayed mules to his ability to put
himself in the place of the mule and imagine where he would go if he
were a mule. My principal criticism of the index to Williston's first
edition is that he seemed to cast himself in the r6le of the mule and
myself in the r6le of the perceptive farmer, where I would much have
preferred to see the r6les reversed. Short acquaintance with the revised
index makes me think that despite its greater length it involves no redistribution of these r6les.
My client has entered a contract with X. X has written him a letter
repudiating the contract. My client, having made commitments on the
basis of the contract, wants to know whether he can safely ignore the
repudiation and continue performance with the expectation of charging
the price to X. If I look in Williston's index under "Repudiation, Effect
of", I shall be disappointed, nor shall I be aided by any cross reference
which will -help me to the heading under which my problem is actually
classified: "Mitigation of Damages". This may not be an inappropriate
place for it in the text, but why should the taxonomy of the treatise be
carried over so rigidly into the index?
Again, an employer promises an employee a bonus, and at the same
time stipulates that the promise shall create no legal liability. The employee, in reliance on this promise, foregoes other opportunities of
employment. May the employee successfully maintain a suit for the
bonus? This has become an important practical question, and several
recent cases have held that the employer is legally liable notwithstanding the express stipulation against liability. 9 Here, surely, is a significant development in contract law which should be made available to
lawyers, however difficult it may be to find a pigeonhole for it in the
existing legal theory. Three of these decisions are mentioned in Williston's treatise in such a way as to reveal their significance. One of them
is, however, obscurely cited in a "but see" footnote'0 to an assertion
that "if the parties to an agreement undertake that no legal liability
shall be created, their undertaking

. . .

will be respected by the law".

A second case is given an equally inconspicuous treatment in another
"but see" footnote," this time appended to an assertion that a "provision
contained in a bargain that neither party will seek judicial or administrative remedies for violation of its terms will be upheld". Finally,
'Tilbert v. Eagle Lock Co., 116 Conn. 357, 165 Atl. 205 (1933); Psutka v.
Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318, 264 N. W. 385 (1936), (1936) 36 CoL. L.
REv. 996; Wellington v. Curran Printing Co., 216 Mo. App. 358, 268 S. W. 396
(1925) ; Mabley & Carew Co. v. Borden, 129 Ohio St. 375, 195 N. E. 697 (1935),
(1935) 49 H4Av. L. REv. 148. As tending in this direction, see the very interesting decision by Judge Parker, George A. Fuller Co. v. Brown, 15 F. (2d) 672

(C.'0C.§21,A. n.4th,
9. 1926).

n §1722, n.

2.
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three of the cases are mentioned in a footnote to a section dealing with
a subject matter which does not on its face even remotely suggest the
problem of the effect of a stipulation against legal liability. "' The problem is not discussed at all in the section on bonuses,"2 and I have been
unable to find any index entry which would lead the reader to these
cases. "Stipulations against Legal Liability, Validity and Effect of" is
a heading not to be found at all, nor is there anything under "Bonus"
which gives a clue to these important cases.
There is, of course, a certain unfairness in illustrations such as I
have just given. They are like loaded dice, but, like loaded dice, they
may convey a lesson. The lesson in this case is that one cannot get the
full use of Williston's treatise without a preliminary acquaintance with
its systematics. It is a book to be studied in advance of the occasion
for its immediate use. Unfortunately, and less excusably, I think, this
is as true of the index as it is of the text itself.
ALLOWING FOR AUTHOR'S PARALLAX

If one wished to determine the truth of a disputed incident which
had been witnessed by a friend and a total stranger, one might well feel
that a more accurate picture of what occurred could be obtained from
the friend's testimony, not because the friend was assumed to be more
trustworthy, but simply because one would be familiar with his biases
and would have learned to make the proper discount for them. In a
similar way, the more familiar one is with a legal treatise, and with the
underlying philosophy of its author, the more readily can one appraise
the contents of the book. This is obviously true where proposals of
reform are involved. It is less obviously and even more importantly
true when it is a question of the book's statement of the existing law.
A body of case law looks different, depending upon the angle from
which it is viewed, and it is important for the reader to know where his
author stands as he describes the scene before him. Borrowing a term
of physics, we may describe the reader's problem here as that of making proper allowance for the author's parallax.
Obviously, the divergence of two legal philosophies cannot be converted into mathematical terms and described as so many degrees east
or west. Furthermore, when I attempt to describe Professor Williston's
parallax, the reader will want to know what my parallax is, which I
am perhaps incapable of giving him, except unwittingly. Nevertheless,
§140, n. 5.
" Two of the cases are cited in the section on bonuses, §130B, n. 5, as standing
for the proposition that the employee's reliance in staying on the job will furnish
consideration for the promise to pay the bonus, but with no intimation that the
court disregarded an express stipulation against liability in order to hold the
emp!oyer.
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the reader may by a somewhat hazardous process of triangulation be
able to derive some guidance from the following remarks concerning
Professor Williston's fundamental approach to legal problems.
One of the most ancient disputes concerning legal method is today
ordinarily conceived to turn on the question of the relative importance
of "logic" and "policy" in the law. Though this phrasing of the thing
points to an important problem, the issue is very carelessly and inadequately drawn, in my opinion, when "logic" and "policy" are opposed
as alternative methods of decision.
The issue which underlies the supposed conflict of "logic" and
"policy" may, I think, be more accurately phrased as follows: To what
extent should the law be shaped by a direct recourse to social and ethical
desiderata? The layman's answer to this question would probably be
"always". But his limited experience with legal reasoning has not
taught him to what extent ethics, or policy, is an "unruly horse to
ride".13 Perhaps we may more accurately say that he has not learned
how easily this horse tires. Relatively simple cases (cases usually much
too simple, as a matter of fact, to get into litigation) can sometimes be
disposed of, in a manner which seems quite conclusive, by a reference
to "considerations of policy". The balancing of interests is easy when
there is nothing on the light side of the scales. But every bit of complexity added to the case seems to increase, in geometric ratio, the
obscurity and the complexly inconclusive character of the interests of
society, till a point is soon reached where a*ratio decidendi phrased
directly in terms of these interests seems unattainable. At this juncture
the inevitable expedient of the lawyer is to take certain established concepts, themselves supposed to be vaguely congruent with underlying
social interests, and to attribute to these concepts the force of independent premises, on the basis of which he can continue his reasoning with14
out further explorations in the quagmire of ethics and policy.
The fact that this second phase of legal method involves the use
of "logic" does not- mean that "logic" is irrelevant in the determination
of "the interests of society", or that "logic" and "policy" are in oppo13 "I for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against arguing too strongly upon
public policy,;-it is a very unruly horse, and -when once you get astride it you never
know where it will carry you." Burrough, J., in Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing.
229, 252 (C. P. 1824).
" Even so thoroughgoing a utilitarian as Hume regarded this procedure as
justifiable under some circumstances. Where the "interests of society" demand
that the case be decided, yet fail to dictate how it shall be decided, he observes,
with apparent approval, that "the slightest analogies are laid hold of [by the lawyers and judges], in order to prevent that indifference and ambiguity, which would
be the source of perpetual dissension ....
Many of the reasonings of lawyers are
of this analogical nature, and depend on very slight connexions of the imagination."
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Section III, Part II, in
ENQuiRiEs (Selby-Bigge, 2d ed. 1902) 195.
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sition to one another. The basic problem of when a direct recourse to
the interests of society should be abandoned can be satisfactorily described in terms of "logic" and "policy" if we picture the two as moving
along together until a point is reached where the terrain becomes too
rough for "policy" to go on, so that "logic" is forced to complete the
journey alone. With this picture in mind, one may without too great
risk of misunderstanding, speak of a decision being primarily determined by "logic" or primarily determined by "policy", meaning, in the
second case, to refer to the situation where policy and logic are working
together, and where the assistance of logic is more or less taken for
granted. But this is a dangerous way of speaking and easily leads to
such absurdities as the notion that legal logic can function in vacuo
without premises shaped by considerations of policy (a belief which
legal realists have sometimes been willing to attribute to their, opponents), or the notion that in the determination of policy, logic is not
involved, and one must here depend wholly upon intuition and hunch
(a belief which legal realists have sometimes been willing to attribute
to themselves).
Turning to Professor Williston's legal method, if we ask at what
point he gives up the attempt to shape the law by direct reference to
social interests, I think the answer will have to be, at the very outset.
What may be called the bases of contract liability, notions like consideration, the necessity for offer and acceptance, and the like, are
nowhere in his work critically examined in the light of the social interests they serve. 15 These things are accepted on faith. This neglect to
refer to underlying social desiderata cannot properly be called "logic".
It is simply an acceptance of what is conceived to be received legal
tradition. It is, if anything, policy, but policy as it is assumed to be
crystallized in certain inherited formulae. It is only when one begins
to fit these "fundamental conceptions" together to form the premises
for further reasoning that the word "logic" becomes appropriate.' 6
Does this mean, then, that "policy" and "the interests of society"
are wholly disregarded in Williston's treatise?' Certainly one cannot
say that. Yet if we ask at what point in Professor Williston's method
"policy" becomes relevant, it will be found, I think, that in general he
admits "policy" only where "logic" has failed, that is, where a syl"It is symptomatic of this disinclination to examine the bases of contract
liability that Cohen, The Basis of Contract (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 553, is cited

only once in the treatise, while Llewellyn, What Price Contract? (1931) 40 YALE
L. J. 704, is not cited at all.
" "I sometimes tell students that the law schools pursue an inspirational combined with a logical method, that is, the postulates are taken for granted upon
authority without inquiry into 'their -worth, and then logic is used as the only tool
to develop the results." Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 210, 238.
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logistic marshalling of traditional concepts fails to yield a certain answer,
or, occasionally (as in the problem of the offer revoked after the offeree
has begun performance of the requested act), where the answer yielded
seems too unjust to be acceptable. In other words, with Williston the
two phases of legal method described aamoment ago seem to be reversed.
Where we spoke of "logic" carrying the burden alone when "policy"
fails, Williston generally invokes "policy" only when "logic", operating
on certain inherited "fundamental conceptions", fails to yield a satisfactory answer.
Even in this matter of summoning policy as a kind of trouble shooter
for logic, I think it can be said that Professor Williston is not, in comparison with his contemporaries, especially inclined to favor policy. He
follows a conservative diagnostic practice, and is slow to declare logic
in distress. This disinclination to favor policy shows itself, furthermore, not only in his reluctance to sound the alarm for logic, but also
in his refusal to follow the example of those juristic physicians whose
fame lies in their ability to administer large remedial doses of policy
without being caught at it. He is no ardent practitioner of what Fuchs
called "crypto-sociology", that is, the manipulation of legal theory to
bring about the result conceived to be socially desirable without making
explicit the social interests thus served. He shows none of the eager
ingenuity of an Ames,1 7 a Cardozo," s or a Vance, 19 to perform feats of
juristic legerdemain in the interest of justice and the better life. Which
is the more admirable attitude is too large a question to be disposed of
-here. Probably, in any event, little could be added to the arguments
made by Ihering and Kohler in their famous controversy concerning
17 Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899)
13 HARV. L. REV. 29. A part
of Ames' argument here is directed toward effecting a reconciliation between the
enforceability of the bilateral contract and a definition of consideration which was
developed with reference to unilateral contracts, as Williston remarks in §103.
is See, especially, Cardozo's opinions in De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431,
117 N. E. 807 (1917); Allegheny College v. National Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, 159
N. E. 173 (1927). I must confess that it is difficult for me to know just how
seriously Cardozo takes the explanations offered in these two cases. He seems in
both of them almost to say, "Of course, everyone knows that the real grounds of
our decision lie elsewhere, but since lawyers like technical reasons, and since they
conduce to historical continuity, here is how we might construct a legal theory to
support our holding."
1"VANcE, LAw OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §133. Professor Vance here explains why it is that courts uphold a considerationless waiver by an insurance
company of an insured's breach of condition. This is because, by a beneficent
construction, the breach of condition is viewed, not as destroying the company's
duty, but as giving the company the power to terminate its duty. By this construction, the waiving company is viewed not as assuming a new liability, but
as surrendering a power to terminate an old liability. "Our law looks with grave
disfavor upon transactions purporting . . .to create duties unless they are attended with a prescribed ceremonial ....
But the law has no great concern for
such ephemeral legal relations as mere privileges, or even for a power of de-

feasance. ..

."

Id. at 487-488.
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the decision in Shylock's Case. 20 Suffice it to say that Williston is
emphatically on the side of Ihering. His concessions to policy, when
they are made, are open and above board. What they lack in enthusiasm,
they make up in frankness. Where the practitioners of "cryptosociology" would seek and probably find some palliative for their
dilemma, Williston says in effect, "This result is wrong from the standpoint of legal theory, and the attempts which others have made to explain it are specious. Nevertheless, I suppose we shall have to put up
with it". 21
Whatever Williston may do, or fail to do, when logic defaults, it
may be argued that my assertion that with him the resort is first to
logic, then to policy, is less descriptive of a peculiarity of his method
than of the method generally followed by common-law writers and
judges. One who feels himself bound by the existing law first determines by a process of "logic" what that law is. If the existing law,
thus determined, happens not to cover his case, then, and only then,
will he feel free to make an independent examination of considerations
of ethics and policy. If this is what Professor Williston does, then, it
may seem, -he merely follows the example of the good judge, who feels
-"In
his Der Kanipf urns Recht (1872), Ihering criticized the decision in

Shylock's Case, arguing that although the judge should have declared the bond
void as against public policy, having admitted the validity of the bond, he ought
.not to have deprived Shylock of his rights by a piece of judicial chicanery. Koh)er,
with his usual violence, contended (in Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz (1883)) that this argument revealed Ihering's complete lack of insight
into the processes of legal history.
Something of the flavor of Ihering's own approach to problems of legal casuistry
may be gathered from the following passage taken from one of his technical articles: "But how can the suit be justified? .. . It is, of course, impossible to regard
the death of the offeror as a fault. I must concede that my theory has here encountered a stumbling block over which I cannot bring it without the most violent
straining. To deny a claim for damages in this situation is a result against which
my sense of justice revolts decisively, and I should prefer to believe that in constructing my theory I have committed some error which I have not myself recognized, rather than exclude a claim in this situation. If, however, the claim is to
be granted [under my theory as now formulated] there is no way out but to
deduce fault in the following manner." There follows a rather apologetic "construction" of the case. Ihering, Cidpa in Contrahendo in 1 GESAMmELTE AUFSXTZE
(Deutschland, 1881) 327, 407-408.
2 See, for example, the discussion of anticipatory breach in §§1306-1307 and
§1314. Occasionally, however, Professor Williston gives the impression of venturing a little himself into the field of legal gymnastics, as in §1255. There is, moreover, a noticeable increase in the use of "crypto-sociology" in the second edition
of the treatise. For example, where previously the liability of the revoking offeror
after the offeree has done part of the act called for was a result merely tolerated
because of its justice, it is now explained. See §§60 and 60A in both editions.
Furthermore, where we are dealing not with "doctrines" and "theories", but with
what may be called the schematics of the law, with diagrammatic visualizations
of the remedy such as are involved in the distinction between void and voidable
contracts, or between suits "on the contract" and suits "based on a rescission of
the contract", Professor Williston shows no disinclination to take full advantage
of -the accommodating flexibility of these notions.
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himself authorized to legislate only within the interstices of the existing
22
law.
Yet the fundamental problem of legal method hidden behind the
words "logic' and "policy" (the problem, that is, how persistently and
how pervasively the inquiry into underlying social and ethical desiderata
shall be pursued), is as acute in the interpretation of "the existing law"
as it is in the creation of new law. If the creator of new law, the natural
law philosopher, is faced with the problem how obstinately he shall
press the inquiry into the interests of society before surrendering to
the more pleasant and facile methods of "logic", the interpreter of
the existing law is faced with exactly the same problem. He has his
choice of taking the precedent at its face value, or of looking behind its
face to the complex of motives and interests which gave rise to it. There
are, of course, difficulties with either procedure. Strictly speaking, the
precedent has no face value, and if the lawyer is to determine what the
court decided, he will have to inquire, within limits, why it decided as
it did. On the other hand, if this inquiry be pressed 'too far, it ends in
an imbroglio of conflicting and overlapping motives in which all orientation is lost and from which the case seems to decide everything and
nothing at the same time. In the interpretation of existing law it may
be necessary for logic to carry the burden after policy has dropped by
the wayside, just as in the creation of new law.
There is, of course, no fixed point at which policy may be regarded
as having made a sufficiently strenuous effort to be permitted to retire
from the field, and the relative tenacity with which the inquiry into
the underlying "why" is pursued has been the object of pendular vacillations throughout the history of the common law. During natural-law
or creative periods it is pressed with relative vigor, to the accompaniment of a sense of being in intimate contact with what is real and what
is important. 23 During such periods the "face value" of precedents
and statutes is seen as a deceptive illusion, behind which one must penetrate to underlying realities. When the pendulum swings in the opposite direction, attention is shifted to legal phenomena, to the external
manifestations of law. Study is directed toward the "logical" implications of precedent and statute, which means merely that inquiry into
underlying motivation is truncated at a relatively early point. During
22 "1 recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they
can do so only interstitially; they are confiuied from molar to molecular motions."
Holmes, J., dissenting, in Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221,

37 Sup. Ct. 524, 531, 61 L. ed. 1086, 1100 (1917).

"' Pound points out that movements in legal -thought are generally accompanied

by a sense of having reestablished contact with what is "real". Pound, The Call
for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 697. This applies as well to

trends in the direction of natural law as to those in the opposite, or positivistic,
direction.
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the down swing of the pendulum in this new, or positivistic, direction,
men again enjoy a sense of having been freed from a hampering illusion, of having reEstablished contact with what is real, significant, and
solid.
It seems reasonably clear that our American law has been going
through a positivistic phase during the last seventy-five years, and that
it is this positivistic philosophy which has been the predominant influence in shaping Professor Williston's legal method. He believes that
there exists in the cases "a law of contract", and that it must be sufficiently simple and consistent with itself to be capable of intelligible
statement. Believing this, he fears the intrusion of vague ethical and
philosophical considerations, even in the interpretation of existing law,
because their corruptive and dissolving influence threatens to make
impossible the very task which the positivist sets for himself, that of
stating what "the law" is. The force of this point is readily seen if
one will imagine the task that would be involved in an attempt to state
the existing law of consideration in terms of the social interests it
serves.
How deeply imbedded the positivistic approach is in current legal
thinking is shown by the fact that most of the criticisms of Professor
Williston's work have accepted without cavil the assumption that the
textwriter's task is that of stating "the law" which others have made.
The controversy between Professor Williston and his critics is, in a
sense, intramural, for it remains largely within the limits of the positivistic approach. This is particularly evident in Professor Cook's extended review of Williston's second edition. 24 He inquires whether
the "broad generalizations" laid down by Williston will account for
"the 'law' as it is found in the decisions", for, he says, from the standpoint of the realist, "that is the acid test of the validity of any generalization". Williston's "principles" of contract law are acceptable to
Professor Cook if they are "distilled from the decisions of the courts",
but only if they are. Professor Cook does not criticize Williston because he suffers from the delusion that there is "an existing law" of
contracts to state. He criticizes him because he states that law in outlines too broad, and puts too much of himself into it.
If Pound is right in assuming that we stand on the threshold of a
new natural-law or creative period, 25 then perhaps we may discern in
the criticisms levelled at our leading textbooks, and in their inevitable
"Cook, Williston on Contracts: Revised Edition (1939) 33 ILL. L. REv. 497.
Though I quarrel with What seems to me to be an excessively positivistic tendency
in Professor Cook's approach, this review, like everything from his pen, is deserving of careful study, and I have profited from it in writing my own.
" POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA

OF AMERICAN LAW (1938)

28-29.
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vulnerability to these criticisms, a closing phase of positivism. By insisting upon judging the textwriter strictly in terms of his avowed
purpose, that of stating "the law", we are hard at work to eliminate
from the positivistic philosophy all the little covert tolerances and inconsistencies which have made it a workable system in the past. We
want the law of the cases stated, but we insist that it be stated right.
All superfluous judicial rationalization, all personal and subjective valuations of the observer, are to be rigidly excluded. We are to trace the
patterns of judicial behavior just as they are. It is the pure, raw, unembellished fact of law that must be stated. When positivism has
arrived at the point of demanding this, it has destroyed itself by the
process of taking itself too seriously. By stating the task it proposes
in impossibly exigent terms, it invites the abandonment of the task.
That the positivistic philosophy is dissolving in its own juices does
not necessarily mean that there is occasion for rejoicing. Though I
cannot believe that a "scientific" and quixotically exigent positivism,
which would be satisfied with nothing less than patterns of judicial
behavior, could have any value other than an unintended destructive
one, it is arguable that there is a real social value in the unselfconscious
positivism which characterized American legal thinking in, say, 1890,
and which occasionally still finds such naive expression in England. Even
so keen a philosopher as Radbruch has suggested that the relative stability of political institutions in Anglo-American countries may be due to
this positivistic bent, to the beneficent illusion, if you will, that there
is an "existing law" .2 To be recalled in this connection also is Maine's
observation that the Greeks were too philosophic to be good lawyers,
and that it took something of the practical and incurious temper of the
Romans to build a great legal system. 27 But if the positivistic philosophy represents, before it enters its self-destructive phase, a valuable
social myth, it can be valuable only so long as it is believed in. There
are numerous signs that this faith is crumbling in this country. When
it has disappeared, there will be an end of "interstitial legislation" and
the beginning, for good or ill, of a new creative effort along the whole
front of the law.
To me it seems clear that the future of American law in general,
and of the iaw of contracts in particular, lies not along the lines of an
ever more rigidly controlled and "scientifically" accurate statement of
the law of the cases, but in a philosophic reExamination of basic premises. This philosophic inquiry will inevitably distract attention somewhat from the task of stating "the existing law", and will concentrate
" Radbruch, La Sicuriti en Droit d'aprhs [a Thiorie Anglaise (France, 1936)
DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT ET DE SOCIOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 86.
6 ARCHIVES
21
M AINE, ANCIENT

LAW (Pollock's ed. 1906) 80-83.
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attention on the forces which have made law in the past and are making
it for the future. In this study of forces which operate across time, the
illusory present instant will tend to disappear, and with it, the law that
merely "is".
There may be, I confess, a considerable measure of wishful thinking
in this hope-expressed-as-prophecy. Whatever the future development
of the American common law may be, however,-whether it moves in
molar or molecular circles, whether it presses an existing philosophy
on to more stringent demands, or proceeds by reformulating its basic
approach-there is one prediction which may be ventured with confidence. The influence of Williston will not disappear from the law of
contracts. The subject has been too firmly molded by him ever to lose
entirely the imprint of his mind. If future generations of lawyers do
not move to the measure of his thought, at least their steps will mark
a rhythmic counterpart to it.

